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Abstract
This paper investigates the implications of imperfect information and
matching/searching for international trade theory. I develop an illustra-
tive model where ￿rms ￿nd such partners by a search through successive
matches. The consequences include linking today￿ s import demand pat-
terns to past changes in costs, protection and interest rates. Today￿ s
policy decisions will likewise a⁄ect future trade. Trade diversion from a
preferential trading agreement may well persist as informational diver-
sion well after the preferential agreement has been scrapped. This has
important implications for the timing of trade liberalisation.
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1This paper presents an alternative to the traditional view that trade decisions
are made under perfect information. With di⁄erentiated products and suppliers
of variable reliability, detailed knowledge of trading partners is important for
many types of goods and services, yet although there is a relatively new literature
exploring the nature of matching in trade and evidence for its existence, the
implications for trade policy and the dynamics of trade ￿ ows have not, to date,
been explored. In the presence of imperfect information, path dependency may
conceivably be just as important on the demand as the supply side of trade.
Search theory indicates that not only will the current pattern of trade re￿ ect
past costs and policy decisions, but the price elasticity of import demand will
be path-dependent. Equally importantly, today￿ s trade policy decisions will
have important implications for future trading patterns and likely future policy
decisions.
To investigate these implications, I build on existing matching models of
trade to incorporate search. I draw a number of propositions, many of which
are new to this literature, linking trade volumes and elasticities to the parame-
ters of the search process and to the past history of trade between countries. If
economies are seen as moving from being relatively closed initially,1 then con-
tract periods and the availability of ￿nance will greatly a⁄ect growth of trade.
The behaviour of trading ￿rms depends to a large extent upon whether they
are already well-matched or still searching for partners. Countries with a large
initial number of well-matched ￿rms will show relatively low price elasticities of
1Trade increased from 6 per cent of global GDP in 1950 to 15 per cent by the mid 1990s
(source: Maddison, unpublished).
2demand for imports and exports, and in particular for trade with new partners.
Apparent home bias in current trade patterns may well re￿ ect past, rather than
present, trade costs and protection.
While there are many applications of this theory, I focus here particularly
upon the implications for the sequencing and timing of trade liberalisation de-
cisions. It is shown, using a fairly simple example, that match-searching theory
strengthens the argument that global welfare is likely to be enhanced by lib-
eralising trade multilaterally rather than by stepwise bilateral deals. However,
individual countries may lose from this route, and I investigate the circum-
stances under which bilateral deals may serve as stepping stones towards global
liberalisation.
1 Outline of the paper
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I review the relatively
recent literature on matching models of trade. I then develop in section 3 a
theoretical ￿ match-searching￿model. This is a very basic model of the search
process, which I use to derive a number of key results expounded as propositions.
In section 4, I investigate the signi￿cance of the path-dependency of match-
searching models of trade for sequential trade liberalisation agreements.
Section 5 suggests other possible applications of the model. Finally, in sec-
tion 6, I brie￿ y consider more realistic but complicated search models. These
are seen as extensions/modi￿cations of the basic model, incorporating consumer
3search or including networking between ￿rms. Many of the basic properties of
the match-searching model carry across to these situations.
2 Background: historicity in demand and supply-
side models of trade
The notion of path dependency on the supply side of international trade is a
familiar one, developed from the infant industry argument and running through
the more recent literature on ￿ learning by doing￿ , scale and agglomeration economies
in trade, which can broadly be labelled the ￿ New Trade
Theory￿ .2 However, there has been much less recognition of the importance
of history and path-dependency on the demand side.
Two important characteristics of import demand are:-
1) In general countries trade far less between each other than the theory
would predict even when account is taken of transport costs.3
2) Trading patterns between countries frequently follow historical patterns.
Hence, for example, the UK trades relatively more with India and Australia,
France with Algeria or Cote D￿ Ivoire.4
2See eg Grossman and Helpman (1993)
3This was most notably shown by McCallum (1995) who demonstrated that,
after correcting for size of economy and distance e⁄ects, trade between Canadian
provinces exceeded that between Canadian provinces and US States by a factor
of around 20. This discrepancy was referred to by Tre￿ er as ￿ missing trade￿ .
Other studies (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) ￿nd much smaller residual
border e⁄ects.
4Rauch (1999) estimates a cross-country gravity model, with products divided
4Much of the current literature ascribes these patterns to either technical
barriers to trade5 or to exogenous di⁄erences in demand patterns, or argues
that transactions costs are underestimated in the gravity literature.6 However,
the idea of habit formation in preferences has gradually been introduced, at
least for aggregate import demand.7
I argue these observed patterns may, to a large extent re￿ ect not exogenous
di⁄erences in preferences, but the rational response of ￿rms and consumers to a
situation where their information on trading partners is incomplete, re￿ ecting in
turn low historic trade volumes. This implies that import demand might best
be seen in terms of matching and searching theory. To date, such a theory has
been developed primarily for the case of inter-￿rm trade. This approach assumes
that each ￿rm￿ s products have di⁄erentiated characteristics - however, unlike
the ￿ love of variety￿model,8 it is not variety of choice that purchasing or selling
￿rms are looking for, but rather the best attainable match for their individual
requirements. The obstacle to ￿nding that best match is that ￿rms have only
into homogeneous and di⁄erentiated products. Incorporation of dummies for
colonial ties and common language is strongly supported in the case of the latter
products, much less so in the former (indicating that historical trade patterns
persist much more where goods are di⁄erentiated and matching/searching is an
important element of trade).
5For the economic signi￿cance of this assumption see LeJour et al (2001). A
wider discussion of technical barriers to trade is in Maskus and Wilson (2001).
6Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 2000.
7While I am not aware of speci￿c evidence on habit formation in trade volumes
between any pair of countries, there is some evidence of habit formation with
regards to aggregate imports. For example, De la Croix and Urbain (1998)
estimate non-durable import demand for France and the USA, ￿nding strong
support of habit formation (compared to a standard life-cycle model) at least
in the latter case.
8Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
5imperfect information. For example in Rauch and Trindade (2003) ￿rms are only
able to tell whether a potential partner is better than a certain threshold match
quality: if a ￿rm already has ties to the region, or if there are common language
ties or strong historic trading links the threshold will be higher. Companies are
more likely to set up trading ties with countries with which they have some initial
familiarity, even if there are other, less familiar countries, where potential pro￿ts
would be higher if perfect information were available. Another consequence
of the one-o⁄ matching models currently discussed in the literature9 is that
￿rms will not all initially ￿nd good potential matches in one country even when
there is a change in the average factor prices in that country relative to other
countries: in this way the relative inelasticity and persistence of trade patterns
is explained.10
Such ties, as well as existing patterns of networking may potentially explain
observed trading patterns.11 They also naturally generate a degree of imperfect
competition in trade, since a ￿rm which has a good match with a foreign partner
possesses a degree of monopoly power, as does a country with good historic trade
ties with a second country.
Nevertheless, I argue that the above models do not go far enough in the
sense that they treat the relative degree of information ￿rms have about foreign
partners as exogenous. In reality, it is probably more sensible to see information
9Though this characteristic is not shared by the match-searching model de-
rived in this paper. The reason import demand is not fully price-elastic in a
match-searching model is that not all domestic-domestic matches are of equally
high quality.
10See Rauch and Casella, 2003.
11Evidence of similar informational e⁄ects in determining cross-border capital
￿ ows is presented by Portes and Rey (1999).
6as a valuable commodity, for which people will search if the cost of searching is
low enough relative to the potential gains, and the history of search determines
familiarity. Costs of searching may di⁄er according to many factors, including
transport costs and existing language and other ties, but also according to costs
of borrowing (information can be seen as a form of capital) and according to the
￿ exibility of the two trading partners. If this model is combined with a history
where transport costs were much higher, and protectionist barriers much greater
in the past than today, then it is quite conceivable that today￿ s observed border
e⁄ects in trade may re￿ ect the ongoing informational e⁄ects of past barriers.
2.1 Match-searching in trade
In this paper, I introduce the assumption that ￿rms acquire information by a
search process over time. I start o⁄ with a simple model: this search is in the
form of a series of successive matches with trading partners, each for a ￿xed
contract period. A ￿rm does not know the quality of a match until it enters
into it. At the end of the contract period it will decide whether to continue
the existing partnership, or to start another search. The cost of searching is
the risk of having a series of poor-quality partnerships, while the bene￿t is the
possibility of eventually ￿nding a much better match.
This initial model is deliberately simpli￿ed in that it concentrates on mod-
elling the matching between ￿rms rather than other elements of trade, and
excludes important elements of networking which may a⁄ect the search process.
7The aim is to draw out the main properties of this basic model, some of which
are quite powerful. I then consider to what extent they carry over to more
complex models.
DEFINITION 1: I de￿ne a match-searching model as one in which a ￿rm
searches for the most pro￿table partner by undertaking a succession of matches,
each for a ￿xed contract period, until a satisfactory match is found.
The key result of this approach is that a ￿rm will choose to search for a
new partner if its existing match quality falls below a reservation level. This
is shown to depend essentially upon interest rates and the minimum contract
period, as well as upon relative prices.
2.2 A simple model of match-searching
In one-o⁄ matching models (see Rauch and Casella, 2003), trade takes place
between two ￿rms, one upstream, u, and one downstream, d, and the extent and
pro￿tability of that trade is directly proportional to the quality of the match
between those ￿rms. Match quality, ￿ud is assumed to be randomly drawn from
a uniform distribution between zero and unity. In a simple matching model the
￿rms make a one-o⁄ random choice of match. A match-searching model di⁄ers
from this framework in that matches are for a given contract period of c years,
and it is assumed initially that a ￿rm can only investigate a new partner by
entering into a contract with it, and burning its bridges with its former partner.
8However, after the ￿rst contract period, the ￿rms are again free to repeat the
random matching process if their initial match falls short of a reservation quality
￿R.12
To set up a basic theoretical model, I start by assuming that ￿rms are dis-
tributed uniformly, in terms of some key characteristics, along the perimeter
of a circle,13 circumference length 2. The circle is simply a diagrammatic rep-
resentation of the a simple probability distribution in which ￿rms are evenly
and uniformly distributed in terms of their characteristics, and no ￿rm is in-
trinsically superior to another. Each ￿rm aims to match with the ￿rm directly
opposite on the circle14: match quality, ￿ud; is equal to the circumference dis-
tance between the two ￿rms, and hence is distributed uniformly between zero
and unity with ￿ud = 1 being the perfect match quality. We assume that both
the volume of output of the two ￿rms and the level of pro￿ts of each of the two
￿rms is proportional to this match quality. Hence
Yu;Yd = ￿￿ud (1)
￿u;￿d = ￿￿ud (2)
where Yu;Yd represent the real output of each ￿rm (de￿ned here to be equal,
12It is worth noting that, unless relative prices change, if a ￿rm had accurate
information about the distribution of potential match quality, then if it once
decided to abandon a partner it will never return to that partner, except perhaps
temporarily (see Section 5).
13This is an adaptation of Salop￿ s model of qualitative di⁄erences between
￿rms, and uses a similar initial set-up to Rauch and Casella￿ s (2003) model, but
di⁄ers in assuming that repeated matching is feasible.
14This could be taken as a schematic representation of complementarity be-
tween ￿rms.
9so that one unit of the ￿nal product requires one unit of production at both
upstream and downstream stages). Trade between the ￿rms in real terms will
equal Yu. ￿u;￿d are the pro￿ts of the two ￿rms, which in the simple version of
the model are equal, the proceeds from the match being split evenly.
Starting initially with a single-country model, the match-searching process
is as follows. In the ￿rst period, each ￿rm type u will seek a partner type d
selected randomly from the pool of available ￿rms. Firm u knows accurately
the distribution of potential partners, but not the exact characteristics of any
one ￿rm d (and vice-versa). The match quality is unformly distributed between
zero and unity, so that average expected initial match quality is ￿ud1 = 1=2.
Average output and pro￿tability of ￿rms in this initial period are therefore
Y u1;Y d1 = ￿=2; (3)
￿u1;￿d1 = ￿=2: (4)
The ￿rst contract period lasts for c years. At the end of that period, each
￿rm can either renew its contract or start afresh with a new, randomly-chosen
match. No ￿rm is assumed to be inherently superior to any other: it is simply
match quality which a⁄ects e¢ ciency. A ￿rm which fails to ￿nd an initially
good match therefore has as good a chance as any other ￿rm if it renews the
10search process. It is also assumed for simplicity that ￿rms have in￿nite lives.
I assume the industry comprising all ￿rms types u and d is small in com-
parison to the economy as a whole, and that wages and prices can be taken as
exogenously given and constant, as are interest rates, r per annum. These par-
tial equilibrium assumptions simplify the analysis considerably. In particular,
they imply that the reservation match quality, ￿R; above which ￿rms will choose
to stick with their existing partner, will be constant over time. In addition, the
symmetry of the two ￿rms u and d and the 50-50 split of pro￿ts imply that
the decision to stick together or renew search will be mutual, and that once
￿rms have found a suitable partner they will stay together permanently.15 Im-
portantly, I also assume for simplicity that a ￿rm has accurate prior knowledge
about the probability distribution of match quality with potential partners, even
though it lacks information on the quality of an individual match.
The series of consecutive search or stick decisions can be represented as a
tree of nested probabilities. At the end of each period of the search process, a
￿rm which had still been searching in the previous period will assess whether
its current match is worth sticking with (￿ud ￿ ￿R, which will occur with
probability 1 ￿ ￿R) or whether it should again renew search (probability ￿R).
After n periods, the probability that it has still not found a satisfactory match is
1￿(￿R)n, so the proportion of ￿rms which will have found satisfactory partners
by period n+1 is 1￿(￿R)n while the proportion still searching will be (￿R)n:
Looking in more detail at period n + 1 the expected pro￿t for those ￿rms
15The analysis is considerably complicated by introducing circumstances where
one ￿rm which thought it had a satisfactory match might be jilted by its partner.
11which are still searching can be written as ￿￿=2, where ￿ is a conversion factor
due to the fact that the length of the contract period may not equal 1. Expected
pro￿t for those ￿rms who start initially by searching but which have found a
satisfactory partner will equal (￿￿=2)(1+ ￿R); in other words it exceeds the
expected pro￿t of searching ￿rms by (￿￿￿R=2). Expected pro￿t over all ￿rms
in period n + 1 will therefore be
￿e
Sn+1 = (￿￿=2)f1 + ￿R ￿ (￿R)n+1g (5)
========================================================================================================
Derivation of equation (5)
￿e
Sn+1 = (￿￿=2)￿n
R + (￿￿(1 + ￿R)=2)(1 ￿ (￿R)ng;
￿e
Sn+1 = (￿￿=2)f￿n
R + (1 ￿ (￿R)n) + ￿R ￿ (￿R)n+1g:
========================================================================================================
By contrast, if initial match quality is ￿ud, then if the ￿rm chooses from the
beginning to stick with its initial partner, its pro￿t in each period will be ￿￿￿ud
.The net expected bene￿t Be
Sn+1 in period n+1 of having started by searching
rather than not searching is
12Be
Sn+1 = (￿￿=2)f(1 + ￿R ￿ 2￿ud ￿ (￿R)n+1g (6)
========================================================================================================
Derivation of equation (6)
Be
Sn+1 = ￿e
Sn+1 ￿ (￿￿￿ud=2) = (￿￿=2)f1 + ￿R ￿ 2￿ud ￿ (￿R)n+1g:
========================================================================================================
Assuming a constant reservation match quality ￿R; and constant interest
rate r per annum, which, crucially, can be converted to an interest rate ￿ per
contract period, where
￿ = (1 + r)c ￿ 1; (7)
it is possible to derive the expected net present value Ne
S (to the beginning of
the search process) of pro￿ts for a ￿rm which chooses to start by searching. This
is a geometric progression, which can be summed to yield discounted present
values
Ne
S = (￿￿=2￿)(1 + ￿R ￿ 2￿ud) ￿ (￿￿=2)(￿R=(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿R)): (8)
========================================================================================================













= (￿￿=2)f1 + ￿R ￿ 2￿udg=￿ ￿ (￿￿=2)[1=((1 + ￿)=￿R) ￿ 1)]:
========================================================================================================
When ￿ud = ￿R, Ne
S = 0: After carrying out some manipulation, it is
possible to show that this is a quadratic equation in ￿R. Of the two solutions,
only the smaller one will fall below unity. Hence, after a little more manipulation
we can write
￿R = 1 + ￿ ￿
p
￿(1 + ￿): (9)
========================================================================================================
Derivation of equation (9)
At any particular value of ￿ud;
Ne
S = (￿￿=2￿)(1 + ￿R ￿ 2￿ud) ￿ (￿￿=2)(￿R=(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿R)): (8)
But when ￿ud = ￿R; Ne
S = 0;
14(￿￿=2￿)(1 + ￿R ￿ 2￿R) = (￿￿=2)(￿R=(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿R));
(1 ￿ ￿R)=￿ = ￿R=(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿R);
(1 ￿ ￿R)(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿R) = ￿￿R;
1 + ￿ ￿ ￿R ￿ ￿R ￿ ￿￿R + ￿2
R ￿ ￿￿R = 0;
￿2
R ￿ 2(1 + ￿)￿R + (1 + ￿) = 0;
￿R = [2(1 + ￿) ￿
p
4(1 + ￿)2 ￿ 4(1 + ￿)]=2;
= (1 + ￿) ￿
p
(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿ ￿ 1):
========================================================================================================
This expression is decreasing in ￿ (for positive values of ￿), and consequently
leads to our ￿rst proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: The reservation match quality ￿R depends only on
interest per contract period ￿, which is a function of the interest rate r and
length of contract period c. Speci￿cally, the shorter the contract period and the
lower the interest rate, the nearer ￿R will be to unity.
The implications of this in practice can easily be calculated. For example,
with c = 1 year and r = 5 per cent per annum, the reservation match quality ￿R
will equal 0.82, and average match quality in the long run will be (1+￿R)=2 =
150:91. By contrast, with c=10 years and r=15 per cent per annum, ￿R = 0:54
and average long-run match quality is 0.77.
While total pro￿ts and output in the ￿rst period of search for those ￿rms who
choose initially to search are the same for all values of r and c,16 in the long run
both will be higher the lower is r and the lower is c. This is because with lower
r or c ￿rms will have a higher reservation match ￿R, and so will be prepared to
keep searching longer, leading eventually to a better average quality of match.
Subsequent average match quality increases over time. Average output per ￿rm
and pro￿ts correspondingly also increase, and in the long run both are higher the
lower is r and the lower is c. We would also expect, of course, that convergence
to the long run value will be faster the shorter is the contract period c.
3 Implications of match-searching for trade
I have shown how the match-searching process in a closed economy moves to-
wards a long-run equilibrium, in which ￿rm match quality varies only over a
limited range from ￿R to unity. Modelling of trade is more complicated, but
I will concentrate in this section upon the opening up of a formerly autarkic
economy to international trade for the ￿rst time. Speci￿cally, I allow upstream
and downstream ￿rms for the ￿rst time to seek matches in a second country. I
will assume that the potential maximum pro￿t of an international pairing in the
16This follows since match quality in the ￿rst period of search is assumed to
be random.
16absence of transport costs or tari⁄s is ￿0, which is greater than the maximum
feasible for domestic-only partnerships by a factor (1 + ￿). However, transport
costs and tari⁄s take proportion ￿ of this pro￿t, so the maximum pro￿t available
to an international pair of companies is (1￿￿)￿0. If a pairing with a foreign ￿rm
is made at random, the average quality match for a trading ￿rm will again range
from 0 to 1, and annual pro￿ts for an individual ￿rm will be evenly distributed
between 0 and (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)￿=2.
Crucially, I will initially assume that this extra pro￿tability opportunity
applies equally to both upstream and downstream ￿rms in the home country
(which we will denote by uh and dh), and that there is a ready supply of foreign
partners. These assumptions maintain the symmetry of the supplier/purchaser
relationship, so that with a 50-50 pro￿t split, ￿rms uh and dh are in agreement
over whether to maintain their current relationship or to start searching abroad.
In the previous, one country, case the expected present value of future pro￿ts
of a ￿rm which chose to search was shown to be equal to the pro￿ts earned by
a ￿rm sticking with its match partner with match quality ￿R, as determined by
equation (5.9).
By analogy, a ￿rm which searches abroad will have an expected present value
of future pro￿ts equivalent to a ￿rm which has a constant foreign match quality
￿RF also satisfying equation (5.9).
But the expected pro￿ts of a foreign match quality ￿RF will equal (1￿￿)(1+
") times the expected pro￿ts of the marginal existing match at home, ￿R. It
follows that, if the economy has reached equilibrium in autarky before starting
17to trade, there will be no ￿rms at home with match quality less than ￿R. If this
is the case, and if " > 1=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1 (i.e. there is no pro￿t advantage to trade)
then no ￿rms will seek overseas partners .
A key conceptual di⁄erence in this analysis is between ￿rms who have already
found match partners, and those who are still searching.
DEFINITION 5.2: A ￿rm is de￿ned as initially searching if at the start-
point of our analysis it has not found a satisfactory partner, ￿ > ￿R. Otherwise
it is de￿ned as initially matched.
An economy is de￿ned here as mature if all ￿rms have found satisfactory
partners.17
Of initally matched ￿rms, a small potential pro￿t advantage from a foreign
partner, ￿, will only outweigh the advantages of avoiding the costs of search for
those ￿rms whose matches were only marginally better than the initial reserva-
tion match quality, ￿R: Most other ￿rms will not ￿nd it worthwhile starting a
search unless ￿ is considerably larger than this.
PROPOSITION 2: For ￿ > 0, all initially searching ￿rms will choose
their next partner from abroad. By contrast, among initially matched ￿rms, the
proportion choosing to abandon their existing partner to search abroad will only
gradually increase as " increases.
17In practice, of course, no economy will ever reach complete maturity, but in
an economy where the great majority of ￿rms have found satisfactory partners,
we would expect most of the properties to be close to those of a mature economy.
18Henceforth, for simplicity, I will assume transport costs and tari⁄s are zero
(where there is trade), so ￿ = 0. In these circumstances, tThe last ￿rms will
abandon home pairings only when " ￿ (1=￿R) ￿ 1, ie when
" ￿ f1=[1 + ￿ ￿
p
￿(1 + ￿)g ￿ 1: (10)
Firms will choose to search abroad if
￿uhdh < ￿RF=(1 + "): (11)
Figure 1 represents diagramatically the proportion of ￿rms seeking a foreign
partner when a mature autarkic economy opens up to trade. In the initial case
(shown by the bold diagonal line) the share of ￿rms seeking foreign matches
increases steadily as " increases from 0 to "￿, where "￿ is the value which makes
equation (10) an equality.
19Figure 1: e⁄ect of a fall in the per contract period discount rate on the pro-
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21Now if we allow the per-contract-period discount rate ￿ to fall from ￿0 to ￿1,
due either to a fall in the interest rate r or a shortening of the contract period c,
then the value of " at which all ￿rms look abroad will fall from "￿
0 to "￿
1, and the
curve showing the response of the proportion of ￿rms seeking foreign matches
in response to changes in ￿ becomes much steeper.
The implication is that the price sensitivity of imports and of exports in-
creases the less ￿ lumpy￿foreign contracts are (the lower is c), and also the lower
the interest rate, r.
Next, it is worth considering what happens if the country is not in a long-run
equilibrium at the time when the trade liberalisation takes place. In the above
analysis, it was assumed all ￿rms had found ￿ satisfactory￿long-run partners,
before the option of looking abroad for partners was introduced. By contrast,
it is possible that some ￿rms were still searching for a partner: in this case,
the ￿rm does not need to compare the potential pro￿ts from a foreign partner
with those if its existing partner, but only with those of the expected return
from the next domestic partner if it continues to search at home. Consequently,
while price sensitivity of import demand for matched ￿rms (those with long-
term domestic partners) is relatively low, all searching ￿rms will switch abroad
if the average price advantage of foreign versus domestic partners, " > 0.
Another way of putting proposition 3 is that searching ￿rms who have not
yet found stable domestic partners will be very price-sensitive in choice of their
next partner, but many initially matched ￿rms will not. A related conclusion
is that the greater the rate of new ￿rm startups in an economy, the greater the
22price-sensitivity of imports.
4 Path dependency and implications for the se-
quencing of trade liberalisation.
The di⁄erence in behaviour between initially matched and initially searching
￿rms underlies the path dependency of import demand. Once a search process
has gone on for long enough, a high proportion of established ￿rms will have
found partners and become matched. Once this has happened, they will be
much less sensitive to the arrival of new potential trade partners.
This has important implications concerning the sequencing and timing of
trade liberalisation with other countries. If country A liberalises trade initially
only with country B, then, if trade with B has a price advantage "B > 0,
some or all of the ￿rms in A will start looking for partners in B (depending
on whether their initial match in A was good enough to outweigh the cost
advantages of entering into search). Now consider that A subsequently decides
also to liberalise trade with country C, which has an even larger cost advantage
"C > "B > 0. If this second liberalisation takes place very quickly after the
liberalisation with B, due to the presence of contract periods, many countries
in A may not even have reached the stage of starting their foreign search, and
will automatically choose the most cost-e⁄ective foreign partner: ie country
C. If the second liberalisation takes place slightly later, so that many ￿rms
23have already started their trial matches with ￿rms in B, then we would expect
proportion ￿R of these to reject their partners in B at the end of the ￿rst match
even in the absence of the second liberalisation. These ￿rms, again, will be very
price-sensitive and will choose ￿rms from C for their next partners. By contrast,
a proportion 1 ￿ ￿R of those ￿rms who had started an initial match with ￿rms
in B will have found their ￿rst foreign partner satisfactory, and would be less
price-sensitive in deciding whether to start trading with C.
If the second liberalisation does not take place until much later, then it is
worth noting that as time progresses, fewer and fewer ￿rms in A would still
be searching B for a new partner: more would have found satisfactory ones.
Consequently, the later is the second liberalisation, the greater the lasting trade
advantage country B has over country C.
LEMMA 1: Other things equal, the proportion of ￿rms in a pair of coun-
tries which are searching will fall over time following a trade liberalisation be-
tween them.
From this follows:
PROPOSITION 3: The price sensitivity of a country￿ s trade share with
another country, and its vulnerability to being displaced by a new partner, is less
the more established is trade between the two initial partners.
PROPOSITION 4: The price sensitivity of imports from a third country
is lower, and hence the level of optimal tari⁄s is higher,18 when a customs union
18It is worth noting that for optimal tari⁄s to be non-zero the world supply
24between two countries is established rather than recent.
4.1 A numerical example
A worked example shows the importance of the historical sequencing of trade
liberalisation deals. Let us examine a three country example, starting with com-
plete autarky. The model is a partial equilibrium model, in which an industry
consists of partnerships between upstream ￿rms, u and downstream ￿rms, d.
The overall price PFi of the ￿nal good (which is the product of pairs of ￿rms
fu;dg) is normalised at unity in all three markets, i = A, B and C. PFi consists
of the upstream price, Pui plus the downstream price Pdi. However the rela-
tive upstream and downstream costs vary: I assume that, in equilibrium under
autarky, PuA = 0:4, PuB = 0:5 and PuC = 0:6. This implies that of the three
countries, A is the most competitive in the upstream part of the industry and
the least competitive in the downstream part, while C is most competitive in
downstream and least competitive upstream. There is one factor only, labour.
The model approach here is partial equilibrium, where the wage rate W is set
at unity in all three countries, and total expenditure on the industry￿ s ￿nal
products is assumed to be a constant amount X, equal in all three countries.
The model here is slightly more complicated than that outlined above. For
price also has to vary with respect to demand by country c: i.e. export supply
curves have to slope upwards.




where ￿ih is a productivity scale parameter, depending on country and industry
and ￿ is the elasticity of output with respect to labour input Lf, and assumed
to be somewhere between zero and unity. It is assumed that each ￿rm also
consumes a ￿xed amount Fih of its output per annum to run. Overall output
of f and its chosen partner g will fall short of Y ￿ depending upon the match
quality ￿fg, where potential values of ￿ are uniformly distributed between zero





It is not di¢ cult to show that, in this model, if wages are set at unity,
Lf = ￿fg(￿￿ihPih)1=(1￿￿); (14)
Yf = ￿fg￿ih(￿￿ihPih)￿=(1￿￿); (15)







1=(1￿￿)) ￿ FihPih: (16)
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It follows that, where prices are constant, output will be proportional to
match quality, as before, as will pro￿ts before deducting ￿xed costs.
Firms face an annual interest rate of r and have a match contract period of
c, as before. Consequently, we can calculate the reservation match quality for
the search process, ￿R as in equation (9) above. The number of ￿rms of each
type, upstream and downstream in country i, will equal Ni, and output of the
upstream and downstream partners in any pair will be equal.
In equilibrium, pro￿ts (after deducting ￿xed costs) for a ￿rm with the reser-
vation match will equal the expected present discounted value of pro￿ts for a
new entrant ￿rm, which in turn will equal zero so that at the margin there is
no incentive on ￿rms to enter or leave the industry. From this we are able to
derive a value for ￿ih:19
Starting with r = 5 per cent per annum and c = 5 years, we have a value
of ￿R = 0:68 (as shown in Table 1). We will assume total initial demand in
19First we note that ￿iu=￿iu = (Piu=Pid)￿￿ . We can substitute from this
into equation (17) noting that where the number of ￿rms is in equilibrium the






28each country, X = 1000; and prices accruing to the upstream and downstream
sections of the industry are as suggested before. In a long-run autarkic equi-
librium, average match quality will equal (1 + ￿R)=2 = 0:84: For simplicity we
assume the output elasticity with respect to variable labour, ￿ = 0:5; and that
the ￿xed cost Fih = 1 for all ￿rms, which gives us the following values for ￿ih
and Ni:
Table 1: pre-trade equilibrium values for number of ￿rms, output, labour and
pro￿t in three-country model.
Country Price Gamma N of ￿rms For avg ￿rm
& industry Net Output Labour Pro￿t
A & u 0.4 3.83 682 1.47 0.49 0.09
A & d 0.6 3.13 682 1.47 0.74 0.14
B & u 0.5 3.42 682 1.47 0.62 0.12
B & d 0.5 3.42 682 1.47 0.62 0.12
C & u 0.6 3.13 682 1.47 0.74 0.14
C & d 0.4 3.83 682 1.47 0.40 0.09
We now assume countries A and B initiate a free trade agreement between
themselves, but excluding country C with which they still do not trade. This
is a partial equilibrium model, in which the industry comprising ￿rms u and
d is small, so we assume no e⁄ect on wages. Consequently the marginal cost
at which a new ￿rm will be expect to be able to enter the market and supply
pro￿tably is the same as the pre-trade price: in other words an upstream ￿rm
in A will be able to supply at price 0.4 and a downstream ￿rm in B will be able
29to supply at price 0.5, so that the price for the combined ￿nal good in the two
countries falls from 1 to 0.9. However, some downstream ￿rms in country A and
some upstream ￿rms in country B will have such good (pre-trade) matches that
they will continue to produce even after their output price falls. The proportion
staying open in this way is given by the formula
￿i = (1 ￿ ￿R(Piu0 + Pid0)=(Piu1 + Pid1))=(1 ￿ ￿R) (17)
and works out at 76 per cent of the initial ￿rms in both cases. The ￿rms in
these good initial matches will reduce output since their ￿nal prices fall. Total
output from surviving existing matches is therefore reduced to around 63 per
cent of its value under autarky. With total expenditure on the good assumed to
be ￿xed (i.e. a Cobb-Douglas upper level utility function), in the new long-run
equilibrium total ￿nal demand rises by 11.1 per cent. The net result is that
downstream ￿rms in country B take an eventual 43 per cent of the downstream
market in country A, and upstream ￿rms in A take a similar share of the market
in B.
Now consider what happens if countries A and B decide subsequently to
open up to free trade with country C as well. C has an underlying comparative
advantage (before taking account of match quality) in the downstream industry
compared to both A and B. Various dates of liberalisation are considered in
Appendix Table 1. The price of each stage of production falls to 0.4, set by the
price charged by new entrants to upstream production in A and downstream
30production in C. According to equation (18), in each country, just over 46% of
the original pre-trade domestic-domestic matches can still be pro￿table. Output
of domestic-domestic matches in each country is reduced to 30% of the pre-trade
levels. This is irrespective of the timing of the second liberalisation deal.
The trade between A and B, when trade with C is liberalised, will depend
crucially upon the timing of the second trade liberalisation: if trade with C is
liberalised only one contract period (5 years) after trade between A and B, then
only proportion (1 ￿ ￿R) = 32 per cent of pairings between ￿rms in A and B
will be of reservation match quality or more, before liberalisation of trade with
C. The remaining 68 per cent will switch demand very easily to a new, more
pro￿table trading partner. By contrast, after 4 contract periods, the proportion
still searching will be reduced to just 21.4 per cent. 73 per cent of these A ￿ B
matches will survive the opening up of trade with C. Taking account of the
reduced output of each of these ￿rms as prices fall, trade between A and B is
59 per cent of its level before liberalisation of trade with C.
Inspecting Appendix 5.2 Table 1 we can see that, if trade between A=B
and C is only liberalised 20 years after trade between A and B, then output of
the upstream industry in B will remain at 84 per cent of its initial level, even
though it has higher underlying costs compared to the industry in C, whereas
if the liberalisation with C took place just 5 years after that between A and B,
output of B￿ s upstream industry would be just 34 per cent of pre-trade levels,
and if the liberalisations were simultaneous it would be just 24 per cent.
Even though long-term prices (after trade between all three countries is
31liberalised) and consumer welfare are the same regardless of the sequence and
timing of liberalisation, there are at least two forms of welfare costs of delaying
the second liberalisation. Firstly, the pro￿ts of the upstream ￿rms in B which
continue to produce because of the delayed liberalisation with C will be less
than the pro￿ts of the upstream ￿rms in C which would have taken their place
given earlier liberalisation. We could call this the ongoing informational trade
diversion e⁄ect. Secondly, however, in the intervening years, ￿rms in both A
and B will have spent e⁄ort (and foregone production) in a search for partners
in A=B which was e⁄ectively wasted when the possibility of ￿nding more cost
e⁄ective partners in C was allowed. This could be termed the intermediate
search diversion cost.
DEFINITION 3: ￿ Informational trade diversion￿is the trade which takes
place between one country and a second, when trade with a third party is poten-
tially more pro￿table, because the costs of searching for information on partners
in a third party outweigh the potential pro￿ts from comparative advantage.
DEFINITION 4:￿ Search investment diversion￿ is the additional cost in-
curred on partners who search for a match in one country under a preferential
trading agreement when they could potentially have searched for more pro￿table
matches elsewhere given non-discriminatory trade policies.
PROPOSITION 5: In a match-searching model, if two countries who have
already liberalised trade between themselves delay liberalising trade with a third
country, there will be welfare costs from both search investment diversion and
32informational trade diversion.
5 Other areas of application
5.1 Search information as capital
We can view information on potential matches as an important, but neglected,
form of human capital. Our model suggests that there are strong parallels
between the economics of accumulation of search information and that of other
forms of capital. The ￿ lumpiness￿of a match (i.e. the length of contract period
in our model) is an important aspect of the cost of accumulation of capital. Our
model indicates that import demand elasticities and export supply elasticities
should be lower for ￿ lumpy￿products, and also lower during prolonged periods
of high interest rates. The latter property really results from the idea that
information is a form of capital, involving ￿nance to cover the investment in
attaining better information by searching. In addition, since new ￿rm startups
may well be lower when interest rates are lower, this tends to reinforce the
previous hypothesis that periods of low interest rates globally are likely to favour
trade growth and liberalisation.
In general we would expect that imports and exports should be more price
sensitive the shorter are foreign contracts and/or the lower the interest rate, as
well as the better-developed are ￿nancial institutions. This is to some extent
borne out by historical research: Rousseau and Sylla (2001), examining the
33history of 17 countries over the 1850-1997 period, found a strong link between
￿nance and economic growth and trade, especially prior to the Great Depression.
Countries with more sophisticated ￿nancial systems engaged in more trade and
were better integrated. Econometric analysis and case studies suggested that
￿ economic growth and the increasing globalization of the Atlantic economies
might indeed have been ￿ ￿nance-led￿ .￿
We would also expect the ￿nancial climate to a⁄ect countries￿behaviour
with respect to trade: other things equal, the lower are interest rates, the lower
are optimal tari⁄s and the greater is the likelihood of more open trade policies.
5.2 Dynamics of trade
The dynamics of trade are another area where match-searching has potential ap-
plication. The issues of the dynamics of trade adjustment and the importance of
history in determining trade ￿ ows in this model are also worthy of investigation.
It is worth noting that, in this model, if there is a one-o⁄ trade liberalisation,
a ￿rm will face a decision whether to stick with its existing domestic partner
or to enter into a search process, and unless relative prices subsequently change
that decision will not change subsequently. Consequently, a ￿rm which is going
to enter trade will do so quickly (at the next end of contract period) after the
trade liberalisation.
PROPOSITION 6: All ￿rms who are going to enter into trade following
removal of trade barriers will do so as soon as their current contracts expire.
34However, after the initial increase in trade volumes from ￿rms entering the
search process, trade will continue to increase more gradually until a new equi-
librium is reached.
This latter proposition is related to the increase in output volumes as the
search process procedes, as noted in proposition 2). It can be shown that, when
"< (1=￿R)￿1, total output in the ￿rst period of entering trade will only increase
if20
" > (2￿R ￿ 1)=(1 ￿ ￿R): (18)
As r and/or c are reduced to zero, ￿R will tend towards 1 and ￿rst period output
is more likely to increase for any price advantage to trade. 21
As for e⁄ects on output: the short run impact of trade liberalisation on
output for a country which is in long-run equilibrium before engaging in trade,
will be a reduction if the price advantage to trade, ", is relatively small and if
interest rates are high and the contract period long. By contrast, the long run
e⁄ect on total output across countries, as match quality improves with search,
will be positive.
20The proof is this is that, if the economy is in a long-run equilibrium pre-
trade, then only ￿rms whose (pre-trade) match quality lies between ￿R and
(1 + ")￿R will choose to search. Average pre-trade output of these ￿rms is
￿(2+")￿R=2. By contrast, average match quality for the ￿rst post-trade match
is 1/2 and average output is ￿(1 + ")=2.
21For larger values of ", total output in the ￿rst period will only increase if
" > ￿R.
355.3 The e⁄ects of variations on the match-search formu-
lation
The model developed above is rather simple in a number of respects. It assumes
there are no speci￿c costs attached to forming a partnership, whether foreign
or domestic, but that the quality of a potential match can only be assessed by
entering into a trial contract of period c. Introducing a ￿xed cost for searching
in addition to this would raise the overall cost of searching relative to sticking
with an existing partner, and so tend to lower the reservation match quality
￿R, encouraging fewer ￿rms to start a search for a foreign partner once trade
is liberalised, and to settle on an eventual partner sooner. A lower reservation
match quality would mean greater variation in the initial quality of domestic
matches. The consequences of these changes are to lower the price elasticities
of trade, making the model less neoclassical in its properties.
Other potential changes would be more likely to increase trade price elastic-
ities. For example, as an alternative to picking a random foreign partner for a
trial period, a searching ￿rm could expend money (eg hiring an agent) to gain
better information on the potential match quality. This would only be done if
it lowered the search costs (which in turn would raise ￿R making trade more
price elastic). It would also raise the possibility that, if two domestic ￿rms in-
vestigated foreign partners and found the combined potential pro￿ts from their
respective overseas matches were less than joint pro￿ts from sticking together,
they could return to each other temporarily for a contract period c, before re-
36newing search. Again this would serve to lower search costs and make trade
more price elastic. It would also mean that not all ￿rms who eventually want
to trade would necessarily start doing so during the ￿rst contract period.
Extension of this model would suggest that ￿rms could investigate a num-
ber of potential foreign partners (with diminishing returns to search, since each
new partner costs money to investigate but the probability of its being a better
partner than the next best in the set investigated falls). Such models would
involve a lot of bargaining between a lot of ￿rms (including the original domes-
tic partner) with possibilities of jilting - in consequence they are likely to be
complicated.
Another possible modi￿cation would be to allow for a constant probability
of ￿rm death ￿ (perhaps with the constraint that this always happens at the end
of a contract). On the one hand, this would be rather similar to raising the per
contract period discount rate ￿ to ￿+￿, so discouraging search and lowering ￿R
for ￿rms with existing partners. This would make the model less neoclassical
in the sense that trade between ￿rms with existing partners would be less price
elastic. On the other hand, in each period there would be a proportion of new
￿rms (or newly bereaved ￿rms) entering the market searching for the ￿rst time.
These would be very price sensitive in terms of choice of foreign partner. In the
very long run, these new ￿rms would dominate demand, though it may take a
long time for this to happen.
Although the match-searching process outlined here applies to inter-￿rm
trade, similar principles could potentially apply to the sale of ￿nal consumer
37goods as well, though with key di⁄erences, such as the fact that many con-
sumers purchase commodities from the same suppliers. An investigation into
the implications of searching for preferred suppliers by heterogeneous consumers
may well produce important insights into the behaviour of import demand over
time. Again the key conclusions of the importance of history in determining cur-
rent import patterns and the importance of sequencing and timing of current
trade policy decisions are likely to be similar.
The simple model I have set up assumes that ￿rms can only use informa-
tion they have individually acquired. In practice, there are strong reasons to
believe there will be some information-sharing between certain subsets of ￿rms.
Mechanisms by which this networking will take place include ethnic or fam-
ily ties between ￿rm owners, the presence of trade associations, the movement
of key sta⁄ between ￿rms and the employment of ￿rms to act as agents in the
matching process.22 Clearly, networking can take a wide variety of forms, partly
determined by historical, institutional and sociological factors, and the precise
nature of the process by which information spreads can have signi￿cant e⁄ects
upon how a country engages in international trade.
The negative aspect of networking is that, if information is freely available
to association members, there is a free-rider problem regarding the initial search
for downstream partners. Firm f has little incentive to search for new partners
(outside the network￿ s existing pool of partners), since it is likely the bene￿t
22See the articles by Rauch, Feenstra et al and McLaren in the (1999) JIE
symposium on Business and Social Networks in International Trade, as well as
the introduction by Feenstra and Rauch.
38of the discovery will accrue to another association member rather than itself.
Consequently, establishing a new network pool may be di¢ cult. It follows that,
in the presence of network e⁄ects, trade with new overseas partners is likely to
be suboptimal, unless there is a good system for reimbursing members of the
network who do the searching. This tends to imply that there may be welfare
bene￿ts to policies which actively promote trade search.
A further related aspect of networking is that, once a network has become
established and has developed a good set of matched partners in two countries,
say A and B, the very fact that equilibrium matches between A and B are better
than in a solo match-search model means that it may be even more di¢ cult
for a third country, C, to break into the market, even after trade is formally
liberalised. In this way, networking will reinforce many of the conclusions of the
sections above regarding informational trade diversion.
The precise way in which a network is set up may well determine how condu-
sive it is to search. This may be a way in which institutional culture of countries
may be re￿ ected in their responsiveness to trade liberalisation. Another related
extension worth investigating is that the search process may also be aided by
clustering of ￿rms of a given type in a given locality, or by the use of signals by
￿rms to indicate their type.23
23There is a considerable literature on agglomeration economies and the
supply-side reasons for clustering of ￿rms (see e.g. Krugman, 1991 and 1995).
However, it may well be that the concentration of ￿rms of a particular type in a
particular locality (such as high-quality steelmakers in She¢ eld, UK) may serve
as a signal to potential customers aiding the search process. A cluster which
arises for geographical or sociological reasons may be reinforced by the fact that
its presence becomes known aiding matching (see e.g. the history of the surgical
steel cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan, discussed in Schmitz, 1999):
39A ￿nal suggested extension is Bayesian search, where ￿rms estimate the prof-
itability of trade with a foreign country only by either searching there them-
selves, or by observing the success or failure of other countries searching for
partners there. As successful matches are observed with a foreign country, a
￿rm will revise its Bayesian prior about the pro￿tability of trade. A Bayesian
model of search for trade which incorporates information from observing other
￿rms may well have similar implications to the networking model discussed in
the previous section: namely, that one ￿rm￿ s search for foreign partners will
carry external bene￿ts in terms of information. Such models will tend to give
welfare bene￿ts to active trade-promotion policies.
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